JEWISH INFLUENCE IN POPULAR CULTURE
"Since the last great
wave," says Woocher, "of
social activism in America
in the 1960's, the rhetoric
of Jewish pursuit of social
justice has been somewhat
muted within the polity.
Greater attention has been
paid to the tasks of Jewish
self-preservation; the polity
has, in the view of many
observers, 'turned inward.'
[WOOCHER, p. 87] In other
words, as the Jewish community
achieves increasing influence
in the American economic
and political worlds, it
is inevitably gravitating
back to the ideological
base that has served Jews
throughout history:
the insular preoccupation
with "being Jewish," Jewish
self-promotion at others'
expense, and the refocusing
of a delineation between
Jewish selves and outsiders.
"For most of [American]
history," says Gordon Lafar,
"American Jewry avoided
the conflict between universalism
and
particularism by identifying
its selfish interests with
the broader
dictates of liberal
universalism. Indeed, in the
early part of this
century, the circumstances
of American politics conspired
to offer
Jews an easy congruence
between the general principles
of liberalism
and their particular
economic and social interest
... In recent years,
however, the marriage
between liberal universalism
and Jewish
particularism has
unraveled ... It has become
increasingly apparent
that the community's
selfish interests diverge
from the dictates of
abstract universalism,
leading the Central Conference
of American
Rabbis to note in
1976 that 'until the recent
past our obligations to
the Jewish people
and all humanity seemed congruent.
At times now
these two perspectives
appear to conflict.'" [LAFAR,
p. 181]
"Even during the Berkeley
sit-in of 1964," notes Stephen
Whitfield, "according to one
report, Hatvikah
[the Israeli national anthem]
was sung; and Students for
a Democratic Society was packed
with Jews, whose Jewish identity
was often disguised or downplayed."
[WHITFIELD, AMERICAN, p. 114]
Using the always reliable
Jewish device pointing to
an irrational, endemic anti-Semitism
as an omnipotent threat to
Jews, Ruth Wisse in 1992 framed
her move to political conservatism
in terms of Jewish self-protection:
"Gentiles
invented ... [anti-Semitism].
Its defeat requires, on the
part of
the
victims and onlookers, a temporary
sacrifice of the liberal optimism
upon
which the whole of democratic
society is founded." [WISSE,
p.
46]
Large
scale Jewish abandonment of
social justice movements was
evidenced during the wake
of the Vietnam war era, especially
after the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war. There were many Jews
active in leftist political
organizations, but with the
state of Israel increasingly
understood by the Left to
be an imperialist and/or colonialist
nation positioned against
Third World struggles, "faced
with the choice," says Seymour
Lipset, "of giving up their
attachments to Israel or dropping
their ties to the Left ...
a significant and visible
number of Jewish leftists
dropped out of the New Left."
[LIPSET, p. 158] "Jews who
had thought that being Jewish
did not matter," says Charles
Silberman, "... discovered
in 1967 that Jewishness lay
at the heart of their being."
[SILBERMAN, p. 201] "We believe,"
proclaimed a Jewish socialist
group called Chutzpah, "that
the form and content of most
Left criticism [of Israel]
is inescapably anti-Semitic."
[LIEBMAN, A, ANTISEM, p. 350]
A Jewish sociologist in France,
Raymond Aron, even declared
that "If Israel disappears,
I do not wish to survive."
[ELLIS, M., 1990, p. 9]
"Resigning in
droves," notes J.J. Goldberg,
"from liberal and left-wing
groups, [Jews] attacked those
who did not do so as traitors
to their own kind." [GOLDBERG,
p. 140] "[Jews] were forced
to choose," says Arthur Liebman,
"between their ethnic identification
and community and their universalist
political movement ... Most
chose their ethnic identity."
[LIEBMAN, A. p. 526]
"When universalistic policies
conflicted with ethnic imperatives,"
note Stanley Rothman and S.
Robert Lichter, "as in the
case of radical critiques
of Israel, Jews were torn
in opposite directions, and
their attachment to radicalism
was weakened." [ROTHMAN/LICHTER,
1982, p. 114] "After 1967,"
remarks Gerald Sorin, "support
for Israel became the common
denominator of American Jewish
life, so much so that no Jew
who was not a staunch advocate
for the Jewish state could
expect to occupy a responsible
position in any major Jewish
organization." [SORKIN, p.
215] "A number of ex-revolutionary Marxists
of Jewish background," says
Alan Wald, "had become pro-Israel
after 1948 and had substituted
either Zionism or some other
form of Jewish ethnic identity
for the revolutionary internationalism
to which they had once adhered."
[WALD, p. 15]
A
1996 book about convicted
anti-Arab terrorist Era Rapaport
even begins: "How does a nice
Jewish boy from East Flatbush,
Brooklyn, a gifted social
worker, a marcher for civil
rights, a loving husband and
father, end up blowing off
the legs of the PLO mayor
of Nablus [in Israel]?" [RAPAPORT,
E., 1996, p. 1] "Ezra," wrote
an old friend to him in prison,
"what did Israel do to you?
You, the freedom fighter.
You who walked arm in arm
with thousands of Blacks in
D.C. You, one of the best
drug-prevention workers I've
chanced on. The devoted social
worker who could make a desolate
human being feel like this
life was worth living. Who
got beaten up for defending
the underprivileged. What
happened to you? How could
you? Are Arabs not people?"
[RAPAPORT, E., 1996, p. 22]
Left-wing
journalist (Village Voice)
Paul Cowan recalls being in
the Peace Corps when the 1967
war began:
"I
remember walking down to the
Peace Corps office, and feeling
quite lonely
when
I realized that none of the
other volunteers was as disturbed
as I was. I
decided
to go to the Israeli Embassy,
and volunteer to serve ...
When I got back
to
the United States, and became
part of the [Vietnam] anti-war
movement, I
found
myself increasingly uncomfortable
with the left's attitude toward
Israel.
I was a dove, but sometimes
[non-Jewish girlfriend] Rachel
and I
would
hear a criticism of Israeli
military policy and find ourselves
reacting very
differently.
She would assume that Israel
was partly to blame; I'd
wonder
whether the criticisms contained
a hint of anti-Semitism."
[COWAN,
P., 1987, p. 19]
Israel's 1967
Six Day War and 1973 Yom Kippur
War, says Rabbi Jonathan Sacks,
"evoked a sense of Jewish
solidarity on the one hand,
and distinctiveness from the
gentile nations on the other.
It strengthened deeply rooted
tendencies in the Jewish tradition
to stress the uniqueness and
isolation of the Jewish people."
[SAIDEL, p. 19] In 1969, in
the midst of this Jewish exodus
from universalist ideals,
Leonard Fein surveyed his
people and wrote that "the
overwhelming ambiguity --
one might even say contradiction
-- of the modern era may be
stated as follows: precisely
at a time when the rhetoric
of universalism has reached
an unprecedented peak, and
precisely at a time when the
myths associated with universalism
have become part of conventional
wisdom, the tribal instinct
has reasserted itself with
overwhelming vigor." [FEIN,
ISRAEL, p. 3]
By the late
sixties, says Common Cause
president David Cohen, "the
Jewish community began to
look inward and deal with
its own interests." [STANFIELD,
p. 1849] By the early seventies,
says Jack Porter and Peter
Drexler, "the Jewish Left
concern[ed] itself primarily
with four basic issues: Israel,
Soviet Jewry, the Jewish Establishment,
and Jewish oppression in America
[sic: the alleged oppression
of Jews]. A conspicuous phenomena
[was] the revival of the Zionist
ideology on campus." [PORTER,
p. xxx]
Jonathan Sacks also
noted Jewry's trend towards
turning back to traditional
Jewish religion (and its "particularism")
in 1994: "In the past two
decades [Jewish] orthodoxy
has risen to great prominence
within most Jewish communities
throughout the world, most
strikingly within Israel and
the United States, two communities
where it had previously seemed
a marginal presence destined
for eclipse. In part this
has been due to demographic
factors, in part to the clarity
of orthodoxy's beliefs and
the high level of commitment
it evokes from its adherents."
[SACKS, J., p. ix] "Orthodox
Jews," noted Jack Wertheimer
in 1993,
"have
assumed unprecedented positions
of power and influence within
the Jewish
the
organized Jewish community.
Since the mid-1970s individual
Orthodox Jews
have
risen to leading administrative
posts in the Council of Jewish
Federations,
the
American Jewish Committee,
the American Jewish Congress,
the Conference
of
Presidents of Major Jewish
Organizations, the World Jewish
Congress, and a
range
of local federations and other
Jewish agencies. Their presence
is symptomatic
of
a shift in priorities in these
organizations to what have
been deemed 'survivalist'
issues'
and away from the traditional
'integrationist' agendas."
[WERTHEMIER, J.,
1993,
p. 122]
Even the Reform Judaism movement,
the largest and most liberal
Jewish religious branch in
America, by 1999 was formally
turning back to the past.
Its Central Conference of
American Rabbis, by a 324-68
vote, "endorsed a return to
traditional practices such
as wearing yarmulkes, keeping
kosher, and praying in Hebrew"
which reflected "a yearn for
a return to some of the old
ways." [STORY, P., 5-27-99,
p. A3]
In
2001, David Berger noted
the extraordinary presence
of the international ultra-Orthodox
Lubavitcher Chabad movement:
"I
was recently taken aback
to learn, for example, that
Chabad rabbis constitute
50 percent of the
rabbinate in England. In
Italy, Milan has a powerful
Chabad
presence
... Any Jewish traveler
in France, where the Lubavitcher
directory lists
35
major emissaries, will testify
to the visibility and significance
of Chabad
institutions
and services there. 13 of
26 synagogues in Sydney,
Australia, are
led
by Chabad rabbis, and the
kashrut authority in
that city, in the words
of my
informant,
'is supervised by one rabbi
only -- Chabad of course.'
A Dutch Jewish
journalist
infomrs me that more than
half of the major Orthodox
rabbis in Holland
are
Lubavitch Hasidim. The head
of the rabbinic court for
the entire city of Montreal
is
a Chabad rabbi. The Lubavitch
directory lists eighteen
major centers in
Brazil
... In a significant number
of Amreican communities
anyone seeking an
Orthodox presence -- sometimes
any religious Jewish presence
-- will find it only
in Chabad. As for Israel,
the movement is disproportionately
represented there
among the country's rabbis
and religious functionaries
and its political influence
testifies to its impact.
Finally, the role of Chabad
in the former Soviet Union,
a vast
territory with a population
of a half-million Jews,
deserves special mention.
The
recently
formed federation of Jewish
communities has intalled
a Chabad emissary
named Berel Lazar as the
country's chief rabbi ...
The activities of Chabad
dwarf
those of all other Jewish
religious kmovements. According
to one very informed
Russian Jew, Chabad will
before long come to be seen
in his couintry as synonymous
with Judaism, and all other
Jewish religious groups
will be perceived as sects."
[BERGER, D., 2001, p. 25]
Reflecting a growing
chauvinist sentiment in the
United States -- Eugene Borowitz
argued in the 1970s that it
was time for a Jewish unmasking,
a shedding of self-deceptions,
a removal of inauthentic American
assimilationist skins in a
return to a fundamental, and
primal Jewish identity. Borowitz
wrote that the traditional
melting pot ideal (of all
immigrants coming to America
to mix into a collective cultural
soup) was malevolently conceived.
"The melting pot ideal," he
said, "[is] a maneuver by
WASPS to maintain power by
making themselves the image
of American life, thereby
relegating all other groups
to inferior status ... the
individual remains the legal
recipient of civil rights,
but his community now demands
proper recognition and significant
power." [BOROWITZ, . 50]
Borowitz is reflecting
here on modern Jewish power
shifts in changing traditional
Jewish aims to hide in public
the private Jewish identity. As one old "Jewish aphorism"
phrases it: "Be a person when
you go out in the street and
a Jew in your home." [HEILMAN,
C., 19992, p. 16]
In modern days, this clandestine
approach to Jewish identity
has been completely reversed
-- "being Jewish" is openly
celebrated
everywhere in popular culture
at-large. Howard Jacobson
notes his own experience in
renewing, to obsessive degree,
like so many, his Jewish identity:
"My own progression
from thinking I must have
been a switched
baby, so Jewish didn't
I feel, to knowing myself
to be so exclusively
Jewish that I barely
had room to know anything
else, was not
entirely welcome to
me. Jew, Jew, Jew. The word
hurt my eyes.
Friends -- even Jew,
Jew, Jew friends -- began
to wonder whether
I had other subjects of conversation.
[JACOBSON, H., 1993/1995,
p. 6]
"It may be hard to
recollect -- or, for younger
people, even to imagine,"
wrote Jewish professor Paul
Lauter in 1996, "but a quarter
century ago few Jewish-American
intellectuals, where ever
they located themselves on
the political spectrum, saw
Israel as central to their
political, much less personal,
identity. Within a year or
two, however, the state of
Israel launched its quite
successful effort to convert
American Jewish identity with
Israeli nationalism ... The sharply secular Jewishness that
had shaped my conscience flagged
before the revival of an organized
piety generally linked to
a fevered Zionism." [LAUTER,
p. 43]
Spearheading "Jewish
revival," American Jewish
institutions are even active
in pulling Jews who had successfully
assimilated into other peoples
in other lands back into the
international tribe. In Poland,
for example, many of the few
Jews remaining there in the
communist era after World
War II married non-Jews and
raised their children as Poles.
With the return of capitalism
to the Polish state in the
1990s, however, American Jewish
cosmetics heir Ronald Lauder
(founder of the "Ronald Lauder
Foundation") and "his advisor,
Rabbi Chaskel Besser, believe
in the viability of Jewish
life in Eastern Europe and
emphasize the return of assimilated
youth to the Jewish fold."
[Weinbaum, p. 27] This includes
Lauder's establishment of
a Jewish school, summer camps,
publications, genealogy projects
to trace lost Jewish roots,
and other programs. "Indeed,"
notes Laurence Weinbaum, "in
recent years the Lauder Foundation
and Jewish communal life in
Poland may have become synonymous."
[WEINBAUM, p. 27] Lauder,
an avid Zionist, has also
been a key economic supporter
of former Israeli prime minister
Benjamin Netanyahu. In 1998,
during a visit to Poland,
Netanyahu "called on young
Polish Jews to learn Hebrew
and move to Israel." [WEINBAUM,
p. 8] The dimensions of this
new-found Jewishness struggling
to be reborn in Poland may
be clearly noted in the subtext
of this observation of Laurence
Weinbaum:
"A
heated debate erupted [at
the Jewish Community of Warsaw
organization]
over whether or not non-Jewish
spouses of Jews
could
qualify for membership [in
the JCW]. The most interesting
aspect
of this debate was the fact
that many of the younger Jews
--
who had come out of the closet
more recently -- were the
most
adamant
in refusing to admit the non-Jewish
spouses. This new-found
orthodoxy
mirrors trends that can be
found in other Jewish
communities
that have undergone revival."
[WEINBAUM, p. 43]
[Among
the pioneers of the Jewish
orthodox revival in Poland
is
Konstanty Gebert, editor of
the Jewish journal Midrash
and
a
journalist who writes for
one of Poland's largest newspapers,
under
the name of Dawid Warszawski.]
[WEINBAUM, p. 32] )
"Many
Jews," says Lucy Dawidowicz,
"found [that] their ideas
of war, which had been shaped
by Vietnam, were irrelevant
to Israel. Views on pacifism,
civil disobedience, resistance
to government, and the inherent
evil of military might were
suddenly questioned." [GLAZER,
AMERICAN, p. 171] "In 1967,"
wrote Village Voice
columnist Nat Hentoff, "I
was trying to learn how to
be a pacifist ... Then came
the Six Day War. 'How are
we doing?' I'd ask .... I
wasn't asking about the state
of nonviolence in the world."
[BRENNER, p. 341]
Hence, as is
so common throughout their
long history, another Jewish
moral double standard was
asserted: arm Israel to the
teeth and cut back American
military spending.
"Though it is true
that Jews," says Seymour Lipset,
"almost to a person, are supportive
of Israel against the Arabs,
and favour giving military
and economic aid to Israel,
they, more than any other
identifiable ethno-religious
group, also tend to be against
a strong American military
posture and a high spending
level for Americans armaments."
[LIPSET, p. 153] During the
Vietnam War, President Lyndon
Johnson complained that "a
bunch of rabbis came here
one day in 1967 to tell me
that I ought not send a single
screwdriver to Viet Nam, but
on the other hand, [the United
States] should push all our
aircraft carriers through
the Strait of Tiran to help
Israel." [HERSH, p. 191] The
results of a Carnegie Commission
of Higher Education study
in 1975 noted that "the proportion
of Jews favoring immediate
withdrawal from Vietnam as
of spring 1969 was twice that
of non-Jews." [LADD/LIPSET,
p. 159]
Yet, notes Chaim
Waxman, "American Jews who
subscribe to the basic tenets of political liberalism do not
apply the same rules to Israel
... Israel is not subject
to the same rules that apply
to political entities, but
rather to what may be called
'family rules.'" [WAXMAN,
p. 142]
"In other words," says
Charles Silberman, "the rules
of genteel civility are limited
to Gentile society; the rules
of personalistic familism
apply to the extended Jewish
family, to all members, rich
or poor." [LEIBMAN/COHEN,
p. 21] This double standard
of "family rules" is dramatically
illustrated by a Canadian
Jew, Mordechai Nisan (who
was raised in western democracy)
and his views of non-Jews
in his second homeland, Israel.
Writing for the World Zionist
Organization, Nisan says:
"The
Land was the special divinely
granted territorial promise
of
Abraham
and his seed ... Non-Jews,
without a role on the highest
plane
of
religious endeavor, are thus
without a role on the plane
of public
activity
... Those of 'the tribe' are
the sole bearers of authority
to
determine
national affairs in the state
of Israel." [HARKABI, p. 154]
"I don't know
how many Jews share his belief,"
wrote Yehoshafat Harkabi in
1989, "but the publication
[of Nisan's] article in a
leading Zionist periodical
is cause for grave concern."
[HARKABI, p. 154] Even in
an "American issues" context,
the Jewish double moral standard
is blatant.
"It is remarkable,"
wrote Alan Dershowitz in 1991,
"how some secular Jews who
regard United States senator
Jesse Helms as a Neanderthal,
regard the Lubavitcher [an
Orthodox Judaism movement]
rabbi -- who shares Helm's
right-wing views on virtually
every issue -- as the epitome
of wisdom." [DERSHOWITZ, p.
335]
Charles Liebman and
Steven Cohen are especially
critical about American Jewry
and its in-group chauvinism.
In 1990 they wrote that
"American
Jews need to square their
Jewish familistic sentiment
with
American
conceptions of equality and
western conceptions of liberalism
and humanism.
In these conceptions there
is something archaic,
unenlightened,
and intolerant about asserting
the primacy of one's kin or
clan ...
The primary attachments ought
to be their friends or coworkers
or to
those with whom they share
acquired traits, not to those
among
whom they
happen to be born. Jews in
the United States have to
answer
for the
implicit particularism of
the Jewish tradition, not
to mention the
notion
of chosenness, which has implications
of superiority."
Many observers even argue that the presumed Jewish altruism and
social activism in the American
civil rights movement of the
1960's had baser motives.
Benjamin Ginsberg argues that
the multicultural coalitions
spearheaded by Jews in the
civil rights era "was a political
tactic" to "undermine the
power" of those establishment
social forces that hindered
further Jewish socio-economic
advancement. [GINSBERG, p.
125] In 1975 Hasia Dinner wrote a PhD thesis
about the way that "Jewish
support for black causes was
a way for Jews to broaden
their own rights without becoming
conspicuous by advocating
their group interests."
[FEINGOLD, p. 130]
"Jewish leaders," wrote Diner,
"representing different socio-economic
classes, ideologies, and cultural
experiences committed themselves
to black betterment and gave
time, money, and energy to
black organizations. The spectrum
was so wide and the involvement
so extensive that one must
conclude that these leaders
acted out of peculiarly Jewish
motives ... [My] book demonstrates
that Jewish ends were secured
by involvement with blacks."
[DINER, p. xiv, xii]
(Similarly,
Jewish author Peter Novick
notes the changing Jewish
strategy in using massive
Jewish attack against generic
prejudice as a tool in fending
off specific anti-Jewish hostility:
"In
recent decades, the leading
Jewish organizations have
invoked the Holocaust
to
argue that anti-Semitism is
a distinctively virulent and
murderous form of
hatred.
But in the first postwar decades
their emphasis -- powerfully
reinforced
by
contemporary scholarly opinion -- was on the
common psychological roots
of all forms of prejudice.
Their research, educational,
and political action programs
consistently
minimized diffrences between
different targets of discrimination.
If prejudice
and discrimination were all
of a piece, they reasoned
that they could
serve
the cause of Jewish self-defense
as well by attacking prejudice
and
discrimination
against blacks as by tackling
anti-Semitism directly.")
[NOVICK., P., 1999,
p. 116]
As
Jonathan Reider frames this
issue: "Jewish liberalism
can also be seen as a self-protective
device of a minority caught
in a hostile plural society.
Milton Himmelfarb has described
this logic as 'that Jewish
particularism which likes
to regard itself as universalism."
[sic] [REDIER, J., 1985, p.
48]
"The Jewish struggle
for equality and fair treatment,"
says Jonathan Kaufman, "was
linked to the struggles of
Blacks for greater opportunity.
It was not a struggle of equals;
Jews did not consider their
plight equal to that of Blacks.
But they recognized in the
Black struggle for civil rights
elements that could benefit
them and conditions with which
they sympathized." [MARTIN,
p. 131] Hence, perhaps three-quarters
of the funding for the three
major civil rights organizations
-- the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee, The
Congress of Racial Equality,
and Martin Luther King's Southern
Christian Leadership Conference
is attributed to Jewish sponsorship.
[MARTIN, p. 132]
"Any support of human
rights in general by Jews,"
says Israel Shahak, "which
does not include the support
of human rights of non-Jews
whose rights are being violated
by [Israel] is deceitful ...
[Jewish] support of Blacks
in the South was motivated
only by consideration of Jewish
self-interest." [SHAHAK, p.
103] "The major role [that
Jews] once played in the civil
rights movement," says Charles
Liebman and Stephen Cohen,
"[is a] myth ... [that] enhances
the self-image of a Jew as
a caring and sensitive minority
selflessly contributing to
improve the lot of other minorities."
[LIEBMAN/COHEN, p. 17] "Among the many myths life and history
have imposed on Negroes,"
wrote Black author Harold
Cruse in 1967, "... is the
myth that the Negroes' best
friend is the Jew." [CRUSE,
p. 476] "The Jews who
were to become neoconservatives
re-examined their relationship
to blacks," obseved Jewish
commentator Earl Shorris,
in 1982,
"They
had always agreed with Cervantes'
decription of the world as
composed
of two families, the Haves
and the Have-Nots, but they
realized that Jews in
America had moved into a new
family and blacks had not.
The interests of the
Haves are different than the
Have-Nots ... The new attitude
toward blacks led to
a new attitude toward affirmative
action and public welfare
... A return to quotas ["affirmative
action"] would have the effect
of displacing many Jews ...
Only a
large and very powerful central
government could redistribute
wealth on an
qual basis, and the Jews stood
to lose a great deal in the
equalizing of wealth.
In the language of the neoconservatives,
all of this had to do with
Jewish interests
... Among the chief Jewish
interests, said the neoconservatives,
was Israel." [SHORRIS,
E., 1982, p. 23-24]
Jews in the academic
world have had a well-known
reputation for political liberalism,
a tendency confirmed in American
academia by a 1975 Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education
study that surveyed 60,000
American college and university
faculty members. Jewish professors,
for example,
were found to be about
twice as likely as their Catholic
and Protestant counterparts
to support the legalization
of marijuana. They were significantly
higher in support of "student
radicalism" on campus and
other deconstructions of the
WASP-created status quo of
society. Yet, when Jewish
faculty members were questioned
about issues that were more
poignantly closer to home
(i.e., the "standards" of
the American university system
itself of which Jewish professors
now had a power stake), "it
is striking," noted the authors
of the Commission study, "that
the gap between Jewish and
non-Jewish faculty is smaller
for items which pertain to
academic standards. Jews were
only moderately more willing
than others to waive academic
standards in appointing members
of minority groups to the
faculty, or in admitting them
to the student body. Jewish
faculty were only slightly
more favorable than the faculty
as a whole to offering a program
of black studies." [LADD/LIPSET,
p. 159]
"In candor," wrote
Arthur Hertzberg in 1964 about
American Jewry in general,
"it need be added that the
Jewish masses appear to be
moving toward a position on
race less liberal than the
views of their leaders and
more akin to the outlook that
is conventional in comparable
segments of the gentile community."
[HERTZBERG, p. 286]
Not quite. In
fact,
according to a Harris
survey in 1978, full in the
face of the Jewish myth of
their exceptional concern
for pan-human justice, Jews
were significantly more
inclined to racist attitudes
than other ("non-Jewish")
whites:
"Jews were less
likely to state that they
wanted their children to go
to
schoo
